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A kind of ethical theory?
T here are several reflections on ethics in Kierkegaard’s pseudon­ymous authorship, but very little on “ethical theory” in the tradi­
tional sense. But since the Kantian impact is strong and clear in 
Either-Or, a closer study of Kierkegaard’s contribution to ethical theo­
ry could plausibly start with the assumption that his ethics is a ver­
sion of Kantian, deontological, duty-ethics. Now my first objective is 
to show that there is good reason to doubt that the assumption 
about Kierkegaard’s Kantianism in ethics will be in accordance with 
the ethical code of Kierkegaard’s Works o f Love. My second objective 
concerns the concept and role of knowledge in the Works o f Love.
E ither-Or is influenced by the Kantian distinction between freedom and necessity. According to Either-Or the ethical 
individual aquires the standpoint of freedom, but already in this work 
we find a difference from Kantian ethics. The supreme principle of 
morality in Kantian ethics stands above socially inherited norms and 
duties; in fact it gives us a standard by which one can measure these 
inherited norms and duties. The Kantian supreme principle is univer­
sal in the sense that it applies to every rational individual. The ethi- 
cist in Either-Or, however, starts his or her moral education with the 
appropriation of the socially inherited norms and duties, gradually 
extending his or her moral universe to all mankind. This process 
seems more like socialization into an existing world than acquisition 
of the Kantian standpoint of law-giving reason.
The lack of universality is perhaps even more clear in Fear and 
Trembling. In this work ethical claims are not directly tied to persons, 
but to functions and roles. It is not Agamemnon as a person who has 
the duty to protect his child, but Agamemnon as a father. And it is not 
Agamemnon as a father who has the duty to protect his country, but
Agamemnon as an army leader. Duties apply to functions and roles 
directly, and to persons occupying these roles indirectly. An ethics of 
this kind could be called archaic for the following reason: when 
Agamemnon sacrifices Iphigenia he is doing his duty as an army lead­
er, but not as a human being, i.e. there is no place in an ethics of pure 
functional duties for duties constraining your actions, whatever func­
tion or role you might have. And it seems to be this restriction of 
ethics to functions and roles that allows the author to raise the ques­
tion of whether Abraham could be justified in transcending the ethi­
cal.
The ethical point of view
N ow, moving to the Postscript, we find a quite different conception of the ethical. In this work ethics is not confined to functions and 
roles, but applies to individuals directly. The ethical claim is describ­
ed as an “indefeasible claim upon every existing individual”, and it is 
said that every accomplishment is “dubious” “unless the individual 
has been ethically clear when he made his choice, has ethically clari­
fied his choice to himself”.1
The ethical claim in the Postscript is universal in the sense that it 
applies to every choosing individual, but it is not seen or understood 
by every choosing individual. In order to discover the ethical claim 
and understand its force, one will need to take or acquire the ethical 
poin t o f view , a point of view which is subjective and not objective. 
The idea can be put, it seems, in a paradoxical way by saying that 
ethics demands that I take the subjective point of view in order that I 
see the ethical and discover its claim.
It is important that the same individual can see itself and the 
world from different points of view, the subjective and the objective. 
In trying to be objective, we take the external view, the view from the 
outside, and we try from this viewpoint to understand our roles in 
history and society. Metaphysics is done from this point of view. The 
objective view is the view of knowledge. It is not my personal stand­
point that matters, but objective truth. The objective view is imper­
sonal. In the Postscript the objective view is the view from which the 
events in our lives are seen as determined by other events, and there 
is no place for freedom. It is the perspective of necessity.
The subjective point of view can be characterized as the inter-
nal perspective, or the view from the inside. Formulated in a Kantian 
way it seems to be the point of view we have as agents acting for rea­
sons, and acting on the implicit assumption that we are free to act 
for reasons. But to Climacus in the Postscript the subjective point of 
view contains more. It is the standpoint from which the world mat­
ters to me, since to become subjective means to become interested 
and take interest in what happens to me. In the Postscript the subjec­
tive point of view is a position that we all naturally and immediately 
inhabit. But there is nevertheless more to it, since we continuously 
have to acquire it; it is so easy to “forget” ourselves, or to forget that 
we are subjects. We have a tendency to want to be something more, 
to be more “god-like” so to say, and view ourselves sub specie aeterni- 
tatis.
If we apply these thoughts about the distinction between the objective and the subjective view to the two problems raised 
by Climacus in the Postscript, we get the following result. The objec­
tive problem concerns of course the truth of Christianity. The subjec­
tive problem, however, is a question about one’s saying yes or no to 
(the teachings of) Christianity. Saying yes or no, to assent or dissent, 
is the subjective problem, or, to be more precise: it becomes the sub­
jective problem when we discover that we have a responsibility for 
our acquisition of beliefs. Climacus thinks that we acquire beliefs by 
choosing sincerely to assent or dissent, and it seems correct to apply 
the concept of “mental act” to assent and dissent in the Postscript. 
But these “mental acts” do not, according to Climacus, follow from 
any proof or disproof. And this is true, of course, in the strict logical 
sense: Even if the conclusion logically follows from the premises in a 
deductive argument, my assent to the conclusion does not follow logi­
cally, neither from the premises nor from my assent to the premises.
We have found here, I think, the location of the ethical in the 
Postscript. The ethical claim concerns the acquisition of beliefs and 
attitudes, and what we do with or to ourselves in acquiring beliefs 
and attitudes. And this ethical claim is possible because we are not 
simply passive copies of our experiences, but beings capable of tak­
ing control and responsibility for the acquisition of beliefs. On this 
background the ethical question becomes a question about what 
principles should guide or govern the acquisition of beliefs, and it 
becomes an ethical question because these principles can be chosen. 
Experience itself, or the principle of induction, is a possible candi­
date for such a principle; it is the principle that comes, so to say,
“from below”. But Kierkegaard criticizes this principle, not only in the 
Works o f Love, but also in The Concept o f Anxiety and in the Postscript.
Works of Love and the Golden Rule
W orks o f Love seems to be an interpretation of the Golden Rule.The whole book seems to be “embedded” in the Golden Rule: 
The second section of the first part of the book, the section with the 
title: “You ought to love”2, begins with an intricate interpretation of 
the “as yourself” in the principle “Love your neighbour as yourself”. 
And the book ends with reflections on “the Christian equal to equal”3, 
i.e. not the principle saying that you ought to do to others what they 
do to you; and not the principle saying that what you do to others 
might happen to you if you were in their place; but the principle 
saying that what you do to others w ill be done to you. (I confess, 
however, that I find it very bewildering that God, in relation to us, 
should follow the first principle: a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an 
eye.)
First a general remark about the status of the Golden Rule. -  To say that the Golden Rule is a moral principle gives better 
sense than to say that that rule is a moral norm. Moral principles are 
more general than moral norms, and can be used as a basis for the 
selection of moral norms. The Kantian Categorical Imperative is a 
moral principle, and so is the Principle of Impartiality. Moral princi­
ples stand above ethical theories such as, for instance, deontological 
and consequential theories. Theories such as deontological and con­
sequential ones ought to be tested not only against our moral intu­
itions about singular cases, but also against moral principles. One 
remarkable thing about ethics is that people seem to agree more and 
better about right and wrong in concrete situations and about princi­
ples, i.e. on the highest and the lowest level of moral discourse, than 
about theories and norms, i.e. those entities that we find on the inter­
mediate levels.
If this remark is correct, it follows that different ethical theories 
are compatible with the Golden Rule, and 1 will now shortly consider 
one modern interpretation of the Golden Rule. In Freedom and Reason 
Richard Hare presents an adapted illustration from Matthew 18.234. 
The situation is that A owes money to B and B owes money to C. B’s
position is the one we shall focus on. Now it is assumed that it is a 
law that creditors may exact their debts by putting their debitors into 
prison. B asks himself whether he ought to take this measure against 
A. He is inclined to do so, he wants to do so, but if he accepts the 
moral judgement that A ought to go to prison, he would also be com­
mitted to accepting the moral judgement that C ought to throw him  
into prison. Since moral judgements are prescriptive, B would also 
have to accept that C take measures to imprison him. But this B is not 
ready to accept. The important point is the last one: there is some 
action that B is not ready to accept if done to him.
This situation is of course rather special. Normally people will 
be affected by our actions in different ways and degrees, and the 
agent will not stand in the same relation to some third person as his 
or her neighbour stands in relation to him or her. In order to practise 
the rule I have therefore to use my imagination. I have to imagine that 
I take the place of the other, and I must decide whether the act is 
acceptable to me in my neighbour’s position, having my neighbours 
interests and preferences.
The process described above is called “role-taking”. Especially 
two pitfalls are important to avoid practising role-taking. The first is 
to fail to distinguish clearly between your own interests and the inter­
ests of the other. Your neighbour’s situation in life might be very dif­
ferent from yours, and if you overlook this difference you might treat 
the other wrongly. -  The second pitfall is to think that you know too 
well what the situation and the interests of the other are. You might 
even think that you know better than the other what his or her true 
interests are.
Three elements in the Golden Rule are important in this connec­
tion. First, it is the idea that I have to practise seif-detachment in the 
sense that my interests and preferences are placed on the par with 
the interests and preferences of the other. Second, I must be sincere 
about interests and preferences in role-taking. I must be sincere 
about what I am willing to will if I were in the position of the other. 
Third, I need to know something about the other. And it is especially 
important to know whether there are any ethically relevant differ­
ences between the other and me.
M oving to the Works o f Love, we find a remarkable difference in the interpretation of the Golden Rule. In this work we 
find, especially in its first part, a penetrating description of the differ­
ences between Christian love and worldly, preferential love. Christian
love is a duty, and as such it is universal, unselfish and autonomous. 
It is universal not in the sense of universalizability of norms, but in 
the sense that it is our duty to treat all men equally, on an equal basis 
and in the same way It is unselfish in the sense that it is our duty to 
give up our preferential self-love; and it is autonomous in the sense 
that it is independent of the “object” of love. Worldly love, on the 
other hand, is inclination, preferential, selfish and heteronomous.
In focusing on these distinctions between universal Christian 
love and worldly preferential love, Kierkegaard excludes some 
genuine ethical problems from his consideration. He directs his atten­
tion so strongly towards the critique of all sorts of selfish preferential 
treatment, that he “overlooks” the problem connected with ethically 
justified preferential treatment. Such differential treatment springs 
from the fact that it is not always right to treat men equally; on the 
contrary, unequal treatment is in many cases the only right thing. 
There is, however, a plausible explanation of this “neglect”. In order 
to practise neighbour love one must treat all men basically in the 
same way, not only independently of individual and social differ­
ences, but also independently of “ethical differences”. A truly good 
and loving person ought to be unaffected by a deceitful act, and he or 
she treats the deceiver basically in the same way as anybody else.
he Works o f Love consist of two parts. When one considers
the main themes of the two parts, one finds a clear differ­
ence between them: The first part is about the duty to love, and its 
main thesis is that true neighbour love is self-denial or self-renuncia­
tion. The first part is a gradual destruction of immediate and natural 
self-love. -  The second part -  on the other hand -  is edifying or 
constructive, and its ten sections explain the works of love. What 
could be the connecting link between these two parts, between the 
self-renouncing and the edifying part?
The negativity of the first part is rather obvious. Step by step 
the reader can follow the description of the interpersonal relation­
ship that have to be given up because they are not true neighbour 
love. One has to give up the worldliness of the world. One has to give 
up all kinds of preferential love -  which is not the same as ethically 
justified differential treatment -  one must give up every preconceived 
conception of my neighbour and his or her interests; and one has to 
give up one’s worldly conception of self-renunciation, i.e. the idea 
that self-renunciation is something that can be understood by human 
standards. The whole process is, it seems, a gradual extension of self­
renunciation, a gradual abstraction from all natural, worldly and 
human interests.
Assuming now that this description of the first part is correct, it 
seems natural to see it as an analogy to the first movement in the so- 
called double-movement of faith, i.e. the movement of resignation. It 
is, we can say, the movement of self-detachment. The second, edi­
fying part could then possibly be seen as an analogy to the second 
movement in the Kierkegaardian double-movement: i.e. the second 
part could deal with the return to the world. Now the main question 
in this connection is how this return to the world should be under­
stood. But, although these two movements are described apart, they 
must be practised together: the movement of detachment and return 
are both present in the works of love.
The first part of Works of Love
Let us now first focus on some broad lines in the “logic” of the first part, the detachment from the worldliness of the world. Accord­
ing to the traditional formulation, the Golden Rule seems to say that 
you ought to love your neighbour in the same way as you in fact love 
yourself. The foundation of the rule seems to be immediate and natu­
ral self-love. The Kantian critique of the rule is based on this interpre­
tation, and one of the arguments mentioned in the Grundlegung, is 
that the rule, so understood, can give no basis for the duties we have 
towards ourselves.5
This is certainly Kierkegaard’s view as well. But according to 
Kierkegaard, and unlike Kant, the duties we have towards ourselves 
are based on man’s relationship to God. Outside Christianity, he 
thinks, there can be no basis for duties towards oneself. The reason 
for this is complex, but must have to do with the ground for despair: 
i.e. that man is not willing to accept his or her dependence on some­
thing other than him- or herself. In this connection the view that 
there can be no basis for duties towards ourselves is interesting 
against the background of the “ethical theory” in Fear and Trembling, 
where duties were attached to our social involvements through func­
tions and roles.
In the Works o f Love, however, Kierkegaard develops the concep­
tion of a duty towards oneself from the Golden Rule, with the assis­
tance of Christian dogma -  that worldly self-love is sinful -  and consi­
derations about human nature -  that men mostly throw their lives 
away in seeking to fulfill their self-interest. I will not go into details of 
the argument leading from the Golden Rule to the idea of a duty 
towards ourselves, but the main step seems to be that one has first 
to become one’s neighbour’s neighbour in order to love one’s neigh­
bour as oneself. If we did not take that first step, our neighbour 
would be the other as he or she meets us in and through our roles as 
fathers, teachers and so on. All these roles are differential and they 
will not generate neighbour love, but only differential duties. In order 
to become our neighbour’s neighbour we must distinguish between 
two kinds of self-love: natural and immediate self-love, and the kind of 
love we have towards ourselves when we are our neighbour’s neigh­
bour. The first kind of love we can call preferential self-love, and the 
other kind non-preferential self-love. In non-preferential self-love we 
place ourselves on a par with our neighbour, not above or beneath, 
but on the same level. This seems to be the first step in the process 
of self-detachment: we are not giving our own personal projects and 
interests any priority over those of our neighbour.
According to Kierkegaard the formulation of the Golden Rule 
should be as follows: you ought to love your neighbour in the same 
way as you ought to love yourself. In modern ethical thinking this 
second “ought”, the “ought” that applies to yourself, is usually 
thought to be merely prudential, and not strictly moral. And the 
moral “ought”, the one that says that you ought to love your neigh­
bour, is consequently thought to be founded on a prudential “ought”, 
which means that it is in our own best interest to be moral and love 
our neighbour. We will secure our own interest better if we place our­
selves on a par with our neighbour. This, we can say, is prudential self- 
renunciation, and it is a kind of self-renunciation that is within the 
scope of human reasoning and understanding.
When morality is based on prudence in this way, there can­not be any room for duties towards oneself, other than the 
duties that are merely prudential. As a consequence we must distin­
guish between humane and prudential self-renunciation and Chris­
tian. Christian self-renunciation is self-renunciation without any “hid­
den”, founding self-interest. And this idea of unselfish self-renuncia­
tion would be impossible, I think, without the presupposition that 
there is another self to be loved in the process of self-renunciation.
It is not difficult to see that an extended, prudential self-interest 
lies at the bottom of the role-taking procedure. In taking the role of
the other, I do not take my own preferences with me, but I do ask 
myself whether an act is in my interest if 1 were in the shoes of the 
other, having his or her preferences. This is, of course, self-interest 
on a higher level than immediacy. But still, extended and “hypotheti­
cal” self-interest is important in this interpretation of the Golden 
Rule, since self-interest is the basis of the fact that the world matters 
to us and that we are not indifferent about what happens in the 
world, to us and to any other person.
The question now becomes how we are to understand the claim 
that we ought to detach ourselves, not only from the narrow and ego­
istic self-love, but also from the extended, prudential kind of self-love. 
The step beyond even extended self-interest is clearly intended to be a 
step beyond the worldliness of the world and beyond the foundations 
of all human ethics. But it must also be considered as a step beyond 
the Golden Rule itself, since this rule, reasonably interpreted, can only 
be taken to mean that extended, prudential self-interest is the basis of 
humane ethics and duties towards oneself. But then it is a dangerous 
step, since it is a point of indifference in relation to the world. And it is 
difficult to see, at this point, the ethical meaning of that step.
The second part of the Works of Love
T he ethical meaning becomes reasonably clear, however, when we move from the first to the second part of Works o f Love. Having 
detached oneself from all prudential, humane self-love, one can now 
introduce a new beginning, a beginning from a new “foundational 
ground”: true, Christian, neighbour love. But this new premise is not 
wholly new; it is, so to speak, the other side of the self-renunciation- 
coin: it is a kind of love which is ready to sacrifice not only some­
thing, but a ll prudential self-interest for the sake of Christian truth. 
This does not imply that anyone who passes through the “stages” of 
self-renunciation will end up with the works of love. There is, it 
seems, a personal either-or involved in the transition.
It has been raised as a critical point against Kantian ethics that 
it is unable to solve moral dilemmas in a world where evil exists. 
Kant’s ethics is considered to be ideal in the sense that a person who, 
acting only on maxims permitted by the Categorical Imperative, 
would act in a way which would be better suited for an ideal world 
than the real world. The Categorical Imperative demands that we
take the standpoints of moral lawgivers and act as members of the 
ideal world of ends in themselves, a world in which everyone acts as 
a universal lawgiver. It is not obvious, however, that an act which 
would be right in this ideal world of universal lawgivers would also 
be right in the “real”, empirical world. On the contrary, since most of 
us have a rather limited capacity to act autonomously at least in 
some periods of our lives, for instance when we are very young, and 
since we are often driven by narrow self-interest in our dealings with 
others, what is right under ideal conditions could be very wrong 
under “real” conditions. Kantian ethics, then, ought to be combined 
with a theory of moral development and an ethical theory suited to 
cases where our capacity and willingness to act from moral reasons 
are restricted.
ould Kierkegaard’s ethics of love do the job? I am in doubt
about this possibility. The ethics of the Works o f Love is real 
in the sense it is designed to fit a world where evil exists, but it is not 
a promising candidate for a universal ethics in an imperfect world. 
The reason is that the ethics of love in Kierkegaard’s book rests on 
the assumption that the description of the world as being in a state of 
sinfulness is correct. His ethics rests on dogmatic, Christian truth. 
But this, it could seem, is only to take the problem of evil seriously. 
But it goes too far, it takes it too seriously. There is a strong “formal” 
reason for this. An ethics of self-sacrifice is not possible in a world 
where self-sacrifice is the general rule. Universal self-sacrifice is an 
ethically impossible code, since it needs some egoistic or self-interest­
ed object to act on.
The “strategy” of love is not, of course, to return good with evil; 
nor, it seems, to return good with good; but to return evil with good. 
Love is, one could say, to fight evil by not presupposing it. (There is a 
problem here, since evil is both known and not known -  but I will 
return to this problem.) To return evil with good is, however, a dan­
gerous strategy, since the long and strenuous fight with evil may 
change the one who loves into one who, if not hates, becomes cold 
and disinterested. But there is a greater danger involved in self-sacri­
fice as a moral code, and this danger does not come from the outside, 
from the worldliness of the world, but from the inside. It is a conse­
quence of a wholehearted work of love. The loving person has under­
stood, according to Kierkegaard, that the only beneficent act one 
man can do to another, is to help him to stand alone, to become him­
self or his own.6 But in doing this, the helper is not allowed to seek his
or her own. To leave all prudential self-interest behind will imply that 
you give up all interest in being confirmed in your own personal 
achievements, you have indeed to give up the whole idea of personal 
projects.
Is it true, as Kierkegaard suggests, that this would be a futile life? 
His first answer is no, but then he goes on to say that this kind of life 
is in a certain sense completely thrown away on the existence of the 
other. Following the ethical code of self-sacrifice he is ready to go 
under as an autonomous individual, and he is changed into an effi­
cient power in God’s hand. -  Could one say, then, that in helping the 
other to autonomy, the helper is changed into a pure means?
Knowledge
T he problem of knowledge in the ethics of the Works o f Love is located in the second part of the book. The problem concerns 
two things: the concept of knowledge in this work, and the role of 
knowledge. First, some general comments on both the concept and 
the role of knowledge in the Works o f Love. The concept of knowledge 
in the work is determined by the role it is thought to fill. And this role 
is ethically motivated; i.e. knowledge has a role to fill in the fight of 
love against evil. Love must fight evil without being affected by it. In 
order to achieve this double aim love fights evil by hiding it or over­
looking it. What is hidden or overlooked is of course there; it is also 
known to be there, and the problematic point is that Kierkegaard 
seems to think that it is possible to know that it is there, without be­
lieving it, or acquiring the belief that it is there.
The works of love are all invisible. They leave, in a strict empiri­
cal sense, everything as it is. On the other hand, they make every­
thing old look new by interpreting the world in the light of love. In 
interpreting the world in the light of love, two means or methods are 
characterized as essential: to believe everything and to hope every­
thing. Love, Kierkegaard says, is a m ild interpreter in the sense that it 
always chooses the mildest interpretation or explanation.7
In order to see how love works as a mild interpreter, we must 
consider the three concepts knowledge, belief and love. Now know­
ledge is not used in the traditional sense of justified, true belief. This 
concept of knowledge is in fact absent, not only from the Works o f 
Love, but also from works like the Fragments and the Postscript, 
though both deal to some extent with epistemic problems. To “know”
in the Works o f Love seems equivalent to: “having the hypothesis 
that...”, or “having the assumption that...”. Knowledge is impersonal 
and subjectless in the sense that it is not appropriated. Knowledge is 
not something that I or you believe; it is only possible truth, and it is 
only held as possible truth.
To think of knowledge in this way is to think of it in the same 
way as the old sceptics thought of it. And, as with the sceptics, Kier­
kegaard’s idea of knowledge is motivated by ethical considerations. 
These considerations are two kinds.
First, the sceptical concept of knowledge seems to admit the possibility of knowing about evil without being affected by it, 
since sceptical knowledge is knowledge without appropriation. It is 
explicitly stated that knowledge in the sceptical sense is of this kind: 
it is not knowledge, Kierkegaard says, that taints man, but suspicion 
or suspiciously to believe.8 And it is not, of course, knowledge that 
edifies man, but lovingly to believe.
The other consideration concerns the interpretation of the 
other person. According to Kierkegaard knowledge plays the role of 
premise-giver for belief, and it does not by itself produce or result in 
belief. Belief, he thinks, is not about the things we know, but about 
things that can explain the things we know. And this kind of belief is 
achieved by means of an inference. This can be illustrated by a sim­
ple example. Assume that we know about an object that has the prop­
erties A, B and C. We cannot from these properties alone infer an 
explanation of these properties. We need some auxiliary principle 
saying that the properties A, B and C are normally caused by some 
other, hidden property D. When we make the inference, we believe in 
the auxiliary principle. This inference is an inference from what is 
known to what is to be believed, it is an inference from “below” and it 
is inductive, not abductive. But it is not an inference exclusively from 
what is known, but from what is known with the assistance of some 
general, auxiliary principle.
Put in a prosaic way, we can say that love is a general, auxiliary 
principle guiding inferences from “below”, i.e. inferences from know­
ledge in the Kierkegaardian sense. The difference between these 
inferences and inductive inferences is not located in the direction of 
the inferences, they are both from knowledge to belief, but in the 
auxiliary principles. The auxiliary principles of inductive reasoning, 
i.e. objective reasoning, are all based on experience and caution. Kier­
kegaard suggests that they consist of a mixture of love and suspi­
cion.9 We can say, then, that love acts as a substitute for experience, 
caution and other prudential, inductive inference-rules in the acquisi­
tion of belief.
good. They are guides on the way “upwards” towards belief. Assu­
ming now that belief is acquired in this way, not necessarily as a sta­
ble disposition, but as a conviction, we must be ready to face the 
world again, i.e. face the possibility of deception and disappointment. 
But love, Kierkegaard says, believes everything -  and is never deceiv­
ed; it hopes for everything -  and is never disappointed. This does not 
imply, however, that a good and loving person, according to Kierke­
gaard, is ignorant of deceit and other wrong acts, but the good per­
son will only know about these things in “a certain sense”. And the 
sense in which he or she knows it, is by knowing about it, but without 
being willing to believe it. Now is this the same concept of knowledge 
as the one which we had before, i.e. the impersonal and subjectless 
kind of knowledge? It cannot be. There is, I think, one good reason for
Consider first the difference between now and then. In the for­
mer situation we had knowledge in the form of knowing about possi­
ble truth. Knowledge without belief. Now the good and loving person 
is involved in the world because he has made his judgement about it, 
or parts of it, guided by love. What happens to this person he or she 
must know about and believe, since it is known that something definite 
has happened: a deceit or another wrong act. These are no longer 
simple possibilities in the eyes of a good person. And Kierkegaard 
says, in accordance with this interpretation, that the loving person 
knows very well that somebody deceives him, but he is not willing to 
believe i t 10 Impersonal knowledge, on the other hand, does not de­
pend on what one is willing or not willing to believe; it is rather a 
question of openness to possibilities. And it is a beautiful thought, 
indeed, that love interprets these possibilities by means of the two 
guiding principles. Difficulties arise, however, the moment one gets 
involved in making judgements. We are then caught by the fact that 
our judgements have possible consequences that are fulfilled or not. 
By not being willing  to believe, we seem to hide from ourselves some 
fact that we know very well, and we know it in the sense that we also, 
or really, believe it.
orks o f Love presents two auxiliary principles of love: to 
believe everything, and to hope everything, i.e. everything
this.
Interpretation guided by love is characterized by Kierkegaard as an interpretational art.11 Is it an art more at home in juris­
prudence than in life? If one asks a lawyer whether he or she believes 
that all his or her defendants are not guilty, one will probably get an 
answer along the following lines: I do not take all cases, the lawyer 
says, and very often I really believe that my defendant is not guilty, 
but when I have reason to believe that my defendant is guilty of the 
charge, my task is to make him or her look as good as possible.
Now this is a perfectly possible situation. The lawyer’s position 
is possible because he or she is not acting on a ll that he/she believes. 
Some beliefs remain hidden. Kierkegaard wants to avoid doublemin­
dedness. To be doubleminded means to want two incompatible 
things, for instance eternal blessedness and earthly goods. Now, in 
the Works o f Love the good and loving person wants to believe the 
good only. But is it not true that it is impossible not to believe that a 
deceitful act is done, when it is known that it is done? Could it per­
haps be the case that a fuzzy lawyer represents a better description 
of what it is to stand between good and evil, since the lawyer has no 
chance at all to purify his or her soul?
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